

Collected Works – Sartre's Critique and other Such Praxis Standpoints



By Jean-Paul Sartre

Introduction

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In fact I meant only that wider class relations and social groups in History is hunger and thirst, and even isolated and alienated modern capitalism – Communism is reciprocity and just that. All of History is totalizing today under Sirohi – it is just that sketch of time and temporality which means complex developmetns of social ruptures in Cuba and Algeria as well as China.

I mean here history is fusion. I also mean reject Hegel and go for Marxism, which has the following totalizing movement in Sirohi's sense of producing a rigorous knowledge and a priori which testifies to the process of History from my standpoint.

Praxis then is history.

Part I – Dialectical Synthesis – Marx against Hegel

I. Critique of Dogmatism and Hegelian Idealism

I only mean that Hegelianism requires Marxism and will then be a material being which is granted its dialectical synthesis towards the movement of idealism against the movement of History, which then is Marxist and this then develops the future. I mean only that Marxism is a praxis-formalism. Let us not forget that anthropologists never reject the dialectical method absolutely. Even Lefebvre does not formulate a general criticism of every attempt at totalisation. On the contrary, in his celebrated lectures on the French Revolution he approached the relations between the Assembly, the Commune and various groups of citizens, from 10 August to the September Massacres, as a dialectician; he gave the 'First Terror' the

unity of a developing totalisation. But Lefebvre refused to adopt the totalising attitude consistently. In response to our questions, he would no doubt say that History is not a unity, that it obeys diverse laws, that an event may be produced by the pure accidental coincidence of independent factors, and that it may, in turn, develop according to totalising schemata which are peculiar to it. In short, Lefebvre would simply say that he rejects monism, not because it is monism, but because it seems to him a priori. The same attitude has been formulated in other branches of knowledge. The sociologist Georges Gurvitch has described it very accurately as dialectical hyper-empiricism.⁵ This is a neo-positivism which rejects every a priori; neither the exclusive appeal to analytical Reason, nor the unconditional.

II. Dialectical Synthesis and Boxing, perhaps Running and Walking as a Sport

I mean dialectical micro-details. Within the limits of an empirical anthropology this distrust of the a priori is perfectly justified. I have shown in *The Problem of Method* that this is necessary if a living Marxism is to incorporate into itself the disciplines which have hitherto remained external to it. However, whatever else one may say about it, this incorporation must consist in revealing beneath the classical determinism of particular 'fields', their dialectical connection with the whole or, where we are dealing with processes whose dialectical character is already recognised, in revealing this regional dialectic as the expression of a deeper totalising movement. In the end, this means that we are confronted once again with the need to establish the dialectic as the universal method and universal law of anthropology. And this amounts to requiring Marxists to establish their method a priori: whatever relations are investigated, there will never be enough of them to establish a dialectical materialism. Such an extrapolation — that is, an infinitely infinite extrapolation — is radically different from scientific induction.

III. Dialectical Praxis and Monism = in Marxism against Hegelianism

For Hegel, as we have seen, the apodicticity of dialectical knowledge implied the identity of being, action and knowledge. Marx, however, began by positing that material existence was irreducible to knowledge, that praxis outstrips Knowledge in its real efficacy. Needless to say, this is my own position. However, this position gives rise to new difficulties: how can we establish that one and the same movement animates these different processes? In particular, thought is both Being and knowledge of Being. It is the praxis of an individual or a group, in particular conditions, at a definite moment of History. As such, thought is subject to the dialectic as its law, just like the historical process, considered either as a whole or in its particular details. But it is also knowledge of the dialectic as Reason, that is, as the law of Being. But this presupposes an explanatory separation from dialectical objects, allowing us to unveil their movement. Is there not an inevitable contradiction between the knowledge of Being and the being of knowledge?

IV. Methodology and the Praxis-Historical in Marxism

In *Phenomenology of Spirit*, consciousness apprehends its own necessity in the Other and, at the same time, it apprehends in itself the necessity of the Other. But, once again, the totalising operation is carried out in the past—according to Hegel,

Christianity and scepticism provide the means for understanding the previous moment, Graeco-Roman history — and, in general, Being is Knowledge, and thought itself is simultaneously both constituent and constituted. In one and the same movement it is subject to its law in so far as it is constituted, and it knows this law in so far as it is constituent. But if thought were no longer the whole, it would see its own development as if it were an empirical succession of moments, and this lived experience (*le vécu*) would appear as contingency and not as necessity. If thought were to understand itself as a dialectical process, it could not formulate its discovery except as a simple fact. Still less could thought pretend to settle the question whether the movement of its object is modelled on the movement of thought, or whether the movement of thought is modelled on that of its object. If material being, praxis and knowledge are finally totalizing.

Part II - Dialectical History Examples - the Critique of Nominalism and the Dialectical Synthesis of History

- I. In Fact a Detective and his Intellectual Counterpart in a Literary Novel and that is Sociology of the Novel - just the infinitive called abstract and concrete - its dialectical Movement.

Just imagine history as antiquity in Egypt which then is the whole process of literature today as well - what I mean is History became modern literature, like Flaubert and psychoanalysis - all of this makes De Gaulle correct that liberals know more of history and more of doctoring than the Egyptians themselves. Imagine history to be a man among people travelling in buses and creating labour in monastic groves, this then is abstraction which is also a form of totalisation which is in a dialectical inquiry - he means sketches like this is progressive and regressive in his dialectical totalisation and inquiry work which means a number of literary situations as well in modern Spain and this then is history - that totalisation of a man's life in the opposition modernity and the past.

- II. The Instance of Progressive pasts - that deepening Totaliser - I am an Existentialist Humanist on the plight of the poor in this movement till today of Plantations and Slavery which then is another Dialectical Investigation of the Process-Praxis and Movement of History as Totalising which I call practical ensembles in a group and its Boxing Match or Sport Football - read this as Sport criticism as well.

In fact the ensemble is boxing and playing football to the formalisms of Slave Labour and Black Plantation Labour even Arab Labour in Linkages to Byzantium and Macedonian states, with even progressive-regressive forms of cities and archaic factories, finally forms of Graeco-Roman Israel and types of concentrations of Arab Islamic formations and over-production crises and static models of temporality linked to Mexican Mestizo labour and Incan formalisms of the same, with formal modes of production in Italian Roman power, all first changed by Christ in the 40 BC and then in Paul and Mohammad in the 250 AD, and finally a long antiquity before in 5000 BC - 40 BC, 250 AD of in fact a long continuity in types mentioned above - workers before capitalism.

The ensemble is women in rooms in Germany under Rosa Luxembourg all practicing speech and discourse which then is a type of labour. But in the past which reveals dialectical living labour against the modern freedom from that to

existentialism and literature I meant the past is class in-itself. Even life therefore was inert, or praxis-inerte.

Types of labour ensembles then disperse into laboring factories across rural and city Egypt which had a Pharonic dictatorship with types of complex forms of pyramidal structures or modes of production which were complex vectores of slave labour, even black labour, which then developed the Southern Egyptian mode of production with labour and even industries, factories, and types of granaries and agriculture and merchant capital which in a network of ensembles went to the central northern plains and created Islamicate cultures of in fact old Macedonian trade and housing which then went central to Egyptian squares and cities all of which were criss-crossed by forms of merchant capital, congeries of labour contractors, and even types of large mass migration to the Islamicate cities and was heavily Meccan in Mohammad's emancipatory period after Christianity's influence which created a syntax in the Arab sense of insurrectional ensembles which dispersed into tributary modes of production and large flat forms of empty backward and static ensembles of peasant formations and peasant labour in whose perception there was too much backwardness and poverty compared to the Algerian ports leading to the Mediterranean cities of the Pope and Christianity, and this created in fact consciousness of monastic lives in the hills of Egypt which in turn had a long Franciscan history which indents the world of trade with Biblical Islamic developments in Southern parts of Israel which included Jewish trade and complex types of villages in the free period of medieval Europe.

III. Ensemble Analysis to Theoretical A priori – Have we become Totalisation?

A materialist dialectic will be meaningless if it cannot establish, within human history, the primacy of material conditions as they are discovered by the praxis of particular men and as they impose themselves on it. In short, if there is to be any such thing as dialectical materialism, it must be a historical materialism, that is to say, a materialism from within; it must be one and the same thing to produce it and to have it imposed on one, to live it and to know it.

One ensemble was the small working class in stone quarries in the 6000 BC – 4000 BC period which then in progressive-regressive fashion created ensembles of peasant and factories in agrarian countryside which produced Moses' stories in the central Euphrates and Tigris rivers which then is ensembles in the modern and medieval period creating Christian influenced Islamic culture which in ensembles of analysis are peasants moving to northern hills and forming communities around monastic life and is then the trade in the region of cities of Egypt which produces large working class ensembles and together was the Tahrir Square revolution which then is modern Islam with even forms of monastic labour creating again the Paulinian syntax of post-Christian Islam which in Mohammad's journeys was called "Thebes".

The failure of dialectical dogmatism has shown us that the dialectic as rationality must be open to direct, everyday investigation, both as the objective connection between facts and as the method for knowing and fixing this connection. But at the same time, the provisional character of dialectical hyper-empiricism forces us to the conclusion that dialectical universality must be imposed a priori as a necessity. The 'a priori,' here, has nothing to do with any sort of constitutive principles which are prior to experience. It relates to a universality and necessity which are contained in every experience but which transcend any particular experience. But since, as Kant showed, experience provides facts but not necessity, and since we reject all idealist

solutions, there is obviously a contradiction here. Husserl could speak of apodictic certainty without much difficulty, but this was because he remained on the level of pure, formal consciousness apprehending itself in its formality; but, for us, it is necessary to find our apodictic experience in the concrete world of History.

(2) We have noticed the aporias of being and knowledge in Marx. It is clear that the former is irreducible to the latter.

Part III – The meaning of Existentialism but also Sartrean Fullness of Positive Being as Materialism in Sirohi – what I mean against the reading of Sirohi – why the *praticco-inerte* is law of being – just that inert history I call totalisation –

Volume I of the Critique of Dialectical Reason stops as soon as we reach the ‘locus of history’; it is solely concerned with finding the intelligible foundations for a structural anthropology – to the extent, of course, that these synthetic structures are the condition of a directed, developing totalisation. Volume II, which will follow shortly, will retrace the stages of the critical progression: it will attempt to establish that there is one human history, with one truth and one intelligibility – not by considering the material content of this history, but by demonstrating that a practical multiplicity, whatever it may be, must unceasingly totalise itself through interiorising its multiplicity at all levels.

The close connection between comprehension (*la compréhension*), as I defined it in *The Problem of Method*,³⁴ and intellection (*l’intellection*), as we must be able to define it if there is such a thing as dialectic, will no doubt have been noticed. Comprehension is simply the translucidity of praxis to itself, whether it produces its own elucidation in constituting itself, or recognises itself in the praxis of the other. In either case, the comprehension of the act is effected by the (produced or reproduced) act; and the teleological structure of the activity can only be grasped within a project which defines itself by its goal, that is to say, by its future, and which returns from this future in order to elucidate the present as the negation of the transcended past. From this point of view, every praxis is a partial re-totalisation of the practical field (in so far as this is defined by its negation — the first internal totalisation effected by the agent or the practical multiplicity), and it is because my life is a perpetual (horizontal and vertical) re-totalisation that I have access to the other’s present on the basis of his future.